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Air disruption scenarios due to inclement weather or air traffic congestion can result
in significant imbalances in the demands and capacities of the affected airports. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) resolves such imbalances by implementing the
Ground Delay Programs (GDP). In a GDP, the FAA first assigns new arrival slots
to the airlines using the Ration By Schedule (RBS) approach, which is an allocation
procedure that assigns slots to incoming flights based on a First-Scheduled, First-
Served (FSFS) criterion. The FAA uses these new arrival slots to determine the
expected delays and accommodates them as ground delays at departure airports.
The notion of FSFS that forms the basis of RBS, is considered to be an industry
standard of fairness. One of the major shortcomings of the RBS approach is that it
does not distinguish flights based on factors like aircraft size, number of passengers,
future aircraft schedules, etc. This results in an inefficient utilization of the airport
capacities. To address this concern, Fearing and Kash [1] proposed a two-stage, non-
monetary strategic prioritization game in which airlines could participate and bid
vi
for priorities at different airports by taking into account their internal costs. This
approach has several advantages over different market-based mechanisms like slot
auctions, congestion pricing and slot exchanges.
In this thesis, therefore, we develop their approach further both mathemati-
cally as well as empirically. Specifically, we prove that a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium exists in the second stage of the game for the general multiple airlines and
multiple airports case. In addition, by imposing the diagonal strict concavity con-
ditions on the airlines’ payoffs, we show that this pure strategy Nash equilibrium
is unique for the two-airlines case. Our experimental simulations on historical data
further show that this approach can achieve significant congestion cost benefits in
comparison to the current RBS procedure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last few decades, the airline industry in the United States has grown
tremendously. To provide a perspective on the current scale of operations, in 2014,
around 80 different commercial air carriers in the US carried over 760 million passen-
gers to nearly 600 different locations within the US, averaging about 30,000 flights
per day (Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) [2]). According to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) [3], the US civil aviation industry in 2012 contributed
$1.5 trillion to the total economic activity and accounted for 5.4% of the US Gross
Domestic Product. Thus, it is clear that the civil aviation in the US, in addition
to providing a means of transportation to thousands of travellers every day, also
contributes significantly to the growth of the economy by creating employment op-
portunities and supporting several other related industries like manufacturing and
tourism. Therefore, a smooth and efficient functioning of the industry is of utmost
importance.
To keep up with the steady growth in the number of air travellers (refer to
Figure 1.1) over the last decade, more and more flights have been scheduled, because
of which air traffic congestion has emerged as one of the key concerning issues for the
regulators to deal with. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)
1
Figure 1.1: Yearly trend of the total number of passengers carried by US Airlines
DATA SOURCE: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) [2]
[2], in 2013, nearly 20 percent of the scheduled flights were delayed by more than
15 minutes and an additional 1.5% were cancelled. Ball et al. [4] estimated the total
direct costs associated with these flight delays and cancellations for the year 2007 to be
around $30 billion, out of which the approximate costs to the airlines and passengers
were $8.3 billion and $17 billion respectively. To put these numbers into context,
consider Figure 1.2 which shows the total operating profits for the airlines in the last
15 years. It can be clearly seen from the figure that the overall profits for the airline
industry are in about the same range as the costs incurred due to delays. In addition,
the fluctuating pattern of the profits reflects the turmoil that the aviation industry
has been going through, particularly due to external factors like the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks and the Financial Crisis of 2008, along with a host of other
factors like rising fuel prices, increasing competition and infrastructure limitations.
Thus, taking into view the uncertain environment in which the airline operate in, it
becomes even more imperative to optimize the existing airline operations as much as
2
Figure 1.2: Airline Industry Profits from 2000-2013.
DATA SOURCE: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) [2]
possible.
The issue of air traffic congestion in the National Air Transportation System
(NATS) is mainly the outcome of a disproportionately large increase in the number
of scheduled flights, in comparison to the existing capacities of the air transportation
resources. Over the years, as the number of air travellers has grown, more and more
flights have been scheduled to meet the increasing demand. In contrast, however, the
capacities of the air transportation resources have remained fairly stagnant. Due to
this reason, many of the major airports in the US today operate at full or nearly full
capacities even during normal operations. This inevitably leads to delays during peak
hours or during severe weather conditions when the capacities of the resources are
considerably reduced. Figure 1.3 shows the major causes (along with their complete
3
Figure 1.3: Causes of Airline Delay.
Air Carrier delays include circumstances within the airline’s control (e.g.
maintenance or crew problems, aircraft cleaning, baggage loading, fueling, etc.).
Extreme Weather delays are due to significant meteorological conditions that causes
delays like tornado, blizzard or hurricane. National Aviation System delays include
a broad set of conditions, such as non-extreme weather conditions, airport
operations, heavy traffic volume, etc. Late-arriving Aircraft delays occur when a
previous flight with same aircraft arrived late, causing the present flight to depart
late. Security delays are caused by evacuation of a terminal or concourse,
re-boarding of aircraft because of security breach.
FIGURE AND CAPTION SOURCE: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) [2]
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descriptions in the caption) for flights delays in the past decade, as noted by the
FAA. A key observation that can be made from the figure is that only the Air Carrier
delays, constituting about 30% of the total flight delays, are under the control of
the airlines. The remaining 70% of the delays are disruptions caused either due to
bad weather or air traffic congestion or security issues, all of which are outside the
control of the airlines. Another important observation that we can make from the
figure is that amongst all the factors, the Late Arrival of Aircraft contributes the
most to flight delays. Even though the FAA does not receive data from the airlines
regarding the causes which lead to an aircraft’s late arrival, this factor is particularly
important and relevant as it clearly indicates the adverse effects of delay propagation
in the airports network. We discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 4, where we use
this observation to define one of our simulation strategies for prioritizing flights.
Based on the time scale of implementation, Odoni [5] proposed long term,
medium-term and short-term approaches for the mitigation of air traffic congestion.
The long-term approaches, which have a time span of around 5-10 years, involve ex-
panding the capacity of existing system infrastructure through the development of
new airports and runways or by using more advanced Air Traffic Control (ATC) tech-
nologies that help in optimizing the usage of existing resources. The medium term
approaches (with a time span between 6 months and 2 years) are aimed at creating
more uniform traffic demand patterns during the day at airports by reducing the
congestion during peak hours through slot auctioning or congestion pricing mecha-
nisms. The short term approaches (time scale of 6-12 hours) involve optimizing the
operations by making changes in the existing Air Traffic Management programs.
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There are several issues, which make the implementation of long-term ap-
proaches difficult in practice. Firstly, the development of new airports and runways
are high-budget, long-term projects, which require substantial funds and take several
years to complete. In addition, the busiest airports are usually also located in the
most congested parts of cities where space constraints are severe, thus making expan-
sion an infeasible alternative. In this thesis, therefore, we mainly focus on short-term
and medium-term approaches to alleviate air traffic congestion.
1.1 Air Traffic Management (ATM)
In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the main
regulatory body, which coordinates all activities pertaining to civil aviation. In par-
ticular, the main objective of the FAA is to create an aerospace environment which
facilitates safe and efficient movement of air traffic . The FAA achieves this objective
by implementing a set of practices, which collectively form the Air Traffic Manage-
ment (ATM) program. The ATM practices can be broadly classified into types: (1)
Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures and (2) Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM)
programs. The ATC procedures are tactical procedures, which track real-time move-
ments of operating aircrafts and ensure that safe separation exists between airborne
aircrafts at any given time. The Air Traffic Flow Management programs, on the other
hand, are strategic practices which streamline the air traffic by resolving imbalances
in the demands and capacities of air transportation resources, namely the airports
and air sectors. From a standpoint of improving the overall system efficiency, the
ATFM programs, thus offer a much larger scope as compared to the ATC procedures.
6
1.1.1 Traffic Flow Management (TFM)
As described above, the FAA implements ATFM programs on the day of oper-
ations to control air traffic congestion at airports and air sectors. These programs are
aimed at improving air safety while at the same time minimizing costs associated with
flight delays. Under the TFM framework, the FAA determines the maximum arrival
capacity for all the resources within the National Airspace System (NAS) taking into
account a number of a factors like weather conditions, runway configurations, number
of runways and scheduled air staff (Gentry et al. [6], Barnhart et al. [7]). In addi-
tion, the FAA also keeps track of the current as well as projected demands for these
resources and whenever the expected demand increases significantly with respect to
the projected capacity, it implements the ATFM program. A key thing to note over
here is that the ATFM programs are implemented only when there are significantly
large imbalances between resource demand and capacity; for smaller imbalances, the
FAA relies on ATC procedures to manage the air traffic.
There are two main initiatives, which have been developed by the FAA under
the ATFM program and are currently in practice. The first initiative, known as the
Ground Delay Program (GDP), was brought into operation in 1981 after a strike
by the Air Traffic Controllers union. Under this initiative, the FAA controls those
airports that have more projected demands than the capacities. Usually, such a
situation arises due to inclement weather conditions or due to some other reasons
like closed runways, etc. The FAA computes updated (reduced) arrival capacities
for such airports and accordingly, assigns new (delayed) arrival slots to the incoming
flights at that airport. Based on the delays associated with each flight, it then holds
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the delayed flights at their departure airports. This practice helps in translating the
airborne delays to ground delays, thereby improving air safety and reducing fuel costs.
The second initiative, known as the Airspace Flow Program (AFP), is very similar
to a GDP. However, in an AFP, the FAA controls a Flow Constrained Area (FCA),
which is a reduced capacity air sector within the NAS instead of an airport.
1.1.2 Collaborative Decision Making (CDM)
Until the mid 1990s, the decisions involving the control and management of
air traffic congestion were made centrally by the FAA. However, at that time, due to
the nonexistence of a real-time information sharing platform, the FAA did not have
updated information about the current schedules of the airlines and had to rely on
airline schedules published months in advance in the Official Airline Guide (Chang
et al. [8]). Similarly, the airlines also had no knowledge about the resource demands
(which the FAA had) and had to rely on weather forecasts to estimate the utilization
of the resources. However, with the introduction of the Collaborative Decision Making
(CDM) paradigm, several new procedures came into practice, which emphasized an
improved real-time data exchange system between the FAA and airlines, and also
called for a greater involvement of airlines on matters that had a direct economic
impact on them. A key enhancement that CDM brought in the GDP context was
the way in which arrival slots were allocated to the airlines. Before the introduction
of CDM, the arrival slots were allocated to individual flights based on their most
recent estimated time of arrival. This disincentivized the airlines to provide updated
information regarding cancelled and delayed flights, as it meant that the airlines
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would lose their original (earlier scheduled) allocated arrival slots. Under the CDM
approach, two modifications were made in this allocation procedure: firstly, the arrival
slots were now considered to be allocated to the airlines (rather than individual
flights) and secondly, the slots allocation procedure was now based on the original
Scheduled Time of Arrival of the flights instead of their most recent estimated arrival
time.
The GDP enhancements under the CDM approach, thus, paved the path for
a three-stage procedure for slots allocation. In the first stage of this procedure, the
FAA allocates new arrival slots according to the projected reduced arrival capacities
for the controlled airport. The allocation of new arrival slots to airlines is done in
the same order as the order of flights in the original flight schedule and is therefore,
termed as Ration By Schedule (RBS). This allotment procedure, based on the notion
of first-scheduled, first-served, is considered to be the accepted standard for fairness
in the airline industry as it preserves the initial ordering of the scheduled flights.
We now consider a small example to illustrate the implementation of RBS pro-
cedure at a controlled airport with four incoming scheduled flights. In this example,
we assume that due to bad weather, the arrival capacity at this airport has been has
been reduced to 1 flight per 10 minutes. The FAA, therefore, implements RBS on
the original Scheduled Times of Arrival (STA) shown in column 1 of Table 1.1 and
assigns new Controlled Times of Arrival (CTAs) as given in column 2 of Table 1.1.
As described above, the RBS allocation is interpreted as an allocation of slots
to airlines rather than an allocation of slots to individual flights. Thus, in the sec-
ond stage, the airlines have the opportunity to reschedule (substitute or cancel) their
9
Flight Original Schedule RBS
A1 7:00 PM 7:00 PM
A2 7:06 PM 7:10 PM
B1 7:10 PM 7:20 PM
B2 7:12 PM 7:30 PM
Table 1.1: Original and RBS schedules for a controlled airport with
reduced capacity of 1 flight per 10 min
flights within the slots initially allocated to them in the first stage. The only re-
striction while swapping flight slots is that each flight must be scheduled at or after
its original arrival time in the new schedule. Thus, in our example, airline B can
reschedule its flights B1 and B2 in 7:30 PM and 7:20 PM slots respectively. However,
airline A cannot do the same as swapping slots between A1 and A2 results in A2
being scheduled at 7:00 PM, which is earlier than its original scheduled arrival time
of 7:06 PM.
Due to flight cancellations or delays, the resulting schedule at the end of the
second stage may contain gaps or vacant slots. Thus, in such cases, the FAA optimizes
the resulting schedules in the third stage by iteratively moving the flights up in the
schedule to fill the vacant slots. This procedure is known as compression and is
described in detail in Vossen and Ball [9]. After the compression stage, the airlines
are notified about the updated schedule and the final two stages in the procedure are
repeated to allow the airlines to make further changes.
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1.2 Literature Review
Despite the introduction of the CDM paradigm and a greater participation
of airlines in the slots allocation procedure, the RBS approach currently in practice,
still remains largely centralized today. Fearing and Kash [1] argue that this makes
the RBS procedure particularly inefficient since airlines, which have the best visibil-
ity into their internal operations costs, are offered very little say in the initial slot
allocation process. Thus, several factors like aircraft size, passenger load, mix of con-
necting passengers and future airline schedules, which would have undoubtedly been
considered important had the airlines been involved, are given no consideration at
all. Addressing the naivety of the RBS procedure, Hoffman et al. [10] also assert that
ideally, the slots allocation procedure should take into consideration the interests of
all the concerned stakeholders, namely the FAA (which wants to maximize the sys-
tem throughput), the airlines (who want to minimize their operating costs) and the
passengers (who want on-time performance).
Based on different metrics, several centralized and decentralized rationing pro-
cedures have been developed and analyzed in the literature. Ball et al. [11] considers
the Ration By Distance and Equity-based Ration By Distance (E-RBD) approaches
for allocating arrival slots. In these approaches, long-haul flights are given priorities
over short-haul flights while assigning slots at a reduced capacity airport. The ra-
tionale for using these approaches is that short-haul flights are able to adapt more
quickly to variations in airport arrival rates. Thus, transferring delays to them can
lead to a more efficient utilization of the reduced capacity airports. Manley [12] simu-
lates the effects of five different rationing strategies (Ration-by-Distance, Ration-by-
11
Passengers, Ration-By-Aircraft Size, Ration-By-Fuel Flow High Preference, Ration-
By-Fuel Flow Low Preference) on the performance and equity of airlines and passen-
gers at three different airports (JFK, LGA and EWR). Depending on the different
criteria, the author finds different optimal strategies for each airport. In addition
to these centralized procedures, different rationing schemes based on market-based
mechanisms like slot exchanges, slot auctions and congestion pricing have also been
explored. Vossen and Ball [9] propose a slot exchange framework in which the FAA
acts as a mediator to conduct slots trades between airlines on the day of operations.
This kind of a framework provides airlines with a variety of options to select more
desirable slots for themselves based on their operational costs. However, because of
the complexities involved, it is very difficult to implement such a framework in prac-
tice. The idea of slot auctioning particularly has been discussed in great deal in the
literature (Rassenti et al. [13], Cholankeril [14], Harsha [15], Plott et al. [16]). Despite
its huge popularity in the academic literature, the implementation of slot auctions
has met with huge resistance from airlines. The most significant reason for this, as
discussed in Ball et al. [17], is that an auction would require airlines to bid money
at airports to gain slots. This, in turn, would impose an additional financial burden
on the airlines. Mechanisms involving congestion pricing (Brueckner [18], Brueckner
[19]) also draw a similar negative response from the airlines for the same reason.
We now describe briefly about the slot rationing procedure developed by Fear-
ing and Kash [1] which will be the main focus of our attention for the remainder
of this thesis, and compare it with the existing approaches discussed in this section.
In the strategic prioritization framework proposed by Fearing and Kash [1], the air-
12
lines participate in a non-monetary auction in which they bid for priority minutes at
different airports with a fixed budget of points allocated to them by the FAA. When-
ever disruption occurs, the airlines use these priority minutes to schedule their flights
ahead of other flights in the initial flight ordering generated for performing RBS. In
this scheme, the slots are rationed by a procedure known as Ration By Prioritized
Schedule, which is almost identical to the Ration By Schedule procedure, currently
in practice.
We see that this kind of a strategic prioritization scheme has several advan-
tages. Firstly, unlike the centralized rationing procedures, in this framework, the
airlines have much more control over their allocated schedules as they can prioritize
different airports based on their needs. Secondly, in this scheme, the auctions are
designed to take place much in advance of the day of flight operations. Thus, in
contrast to the slot exchange mechanisms, the complex decisions are taken several
(around 6-12) months earlier and hence, the complications associated with slot ex-
change procedures is avoided. Thirdly and most importantly, in this approach, the
airlines do not place monetary bids; rather, they participate in the auctions with
bids in the form of points allocated to them by the FAA. This ensures that additional
monetary costs are not incurred by the airlines. In addition, once the priority minutes
have been allocated to the airlines, the slots allocation procedure is almost identical
to the current RBS procedure in practice, making this framework comparatively eas-
ier to implement. Another advantage of adopting this framework from a regulator’s
perspective is that by controlling the points budget of airlines, the regulator can in-
centivize them to schedule lesser number of flights. This is especially especially useful
13
as it can help in controlling congestion within the air transportation system.
1.3 Contribution and Outline of Thesis
As described in the previous section, the strategic prioritization framework
proposed by Fearing and Kash [1] has several practical advantages over other ap-
proaches discussed in literature. The main focus of the thesis, therefore, is to develop
further the theoretical results for this framework and show through simulations on
historical data that significant congestion cost benefits are achieved by using strategic
prioritization. The list given below explain the main contributions of the thesis in
more detail:
1. Development of the Modified Ration By Prioritized Schedule (RBPS) Algorithm
In this thesis, we first show the limitations of the RBPS procedure introduced
by Fearing and Kash [1] and then develop a new, more consistent Modified
RBPS algorithm for rationing arrival slots based on prioritized schedules. Using
this algorithm, we further construct a comprehensive example to motivate the
benefits of adopting a strategic prioritization framework in the real world.
2. Extension of Theoretical Results
We extend the theoretical work done by Fearing and Kash [1] to prove the
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the second stage of their model
for a generalized multiple airlines and multiple airports case. In addition, by
showing that the diagonal strict concavity condition (Rosen [20]) holds for the
second stage subgame, we also prove that this equilibrium is unique for the two
14
airlines and multiple airports case.
3. Simulating the Strategic Prioritization Framework for Historical Flight Data
We develop two different bidding strategies for the airlines to carry out simu-
lations on historical disruption scenarios. While one strategy simply sets the
airline bids at an airport to be proportional to the number of seats on all the
incoming flights, the second strategy uses a metric that integrates the concept
of delay multipliers (Beatty et al. [21]) with the Airline Disruption Response
model (Fearing and Barnhart [22]) to measure delay propagation for an air-
line at an airport. We then simulate the proposed framework for these airline
strategies to investigate the congestion cost benefits of strategic prioritization.
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the
strategic prioritization framework and develops motivation for the approach through
an example. Chapter 3 describes the two stage game theoretic model proposed by
Fearing and Kash [1] and provides mathematical proofs for the existence and unique-
ness of Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the model. Chapter 4 discusses the
framework for conducting simulations and develops two different prioritization strate-
gies for airlines. Chapter 5 summarizes the results and limitations of our experiments,
and discusses the directions for future research.
15
Chapter 2
The Strategic Prioritization Approach
In the Introduction chapter, we briefly described about the strategic priori-
tization framework proposed by Fearing and Kash [1] and discussed its merits over
other approaches that have been developed so far. In this chapter, we first provide
a more detailed overview of this framework. We then describe the Ration By Pri-
oritized Schedule (RBPS) procedure which Fearing and Kash [1] developed in their
paper for rationing prioritized schedules. We show the limitations of this procedure
and develop a new Modified RBPS algorithm. Finally, using this new algorithm, we
motivate the benefits of strategic prioritization approach through a simple example.
2.1 Strategic Prioritization Framework
The strategic prioritization framework can be basically thought of as consist-
ing of a non-monetary auction in addition to the three-stage sequential evaluation
procedure described in Section 1.1.2. As discussed in the last chapter, the key thing
to note over here is that the auction for priority minutes takes place much in advance
(around 6-12 months) of the sequential evaluation procedure, which is brought into
effect on the day of operations whenever a disruption occurs. Each airline first par-
ticipates in the non-monetary auction, where it bids for priorities at all airports using
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a pool of points provided by the regulator. For every airport, each airline receives
priority minutes from the auction, which are split equally among all its flights sched-
uled at that airport. The scheduled arrival times of the flights are offset (earlier) by
the number of priority minutes their respective airlines receive for those flights. In
the subsequent step, the slots are rationed based on the prioritized schedules using a
procedure similar to the RBS approach.
2.2 Rationing Prioritized Schedules
Fearing and Kash [1] developed a Ration By Prioritized Schedule (RBPS)
procedure for allocating slots to airlines based on prioritized schedules. This RBPS
procedure is basically an extension of the RBS procedure currently in practice. In
the RBPS procedure, the flights are first arranged in the increasing order of their
prioritized times, and then RBS is applied on these times. For clarity (using the same
terminology as used by the authors), if a flight f is originally scheduled at a time αf
and it receives a priority of pf minutes from the auction, then the prioritized time for
that flight is given as αf - pf . For the implementation of RBPS, the prioritized times,
αf - pf for all flights are first sorted in increasing order and then, RBS is executed on
them. To see how RBPS works, we consider the same hypothetical example that we
considered in Section 1. This time, however, we assume that Airlines A and B receive
priorities of 4 and 12 minutes respectively for all of their flights. The prioritized
schedule, thus created, is given in column 4 of Table 2.1. When RBS is used on
prioritized times listed in this column, we get the RBPS schedule as given in column
5 of Table 2.1.
17
Flight Original Schedule RBS Prioritized Schedule RBPS
A1 7:00 PM 7:00 PM 6:56 PM 7:00 PM
A2 7:06 PM 7:10 PM 7:02 PM 7:30 PM
B1 7:10 PM 7:20 PM 6:58 PM 7:10 PM
B2 7:12 PM 7:30 PM 7:00 PM 7:20 PM
Table 2.1: Original, RBS, Prioritized and RBPS schedules for a
controlled airport with reduced capacity of 1 flight per 10 min
In the above example, we see that by gaining priority minutes, the airline B
flights (B1 and B2) are now scheduled ahead of the airline A flight-A2, which was
originally scheduled earlier than both the airline B flights. If we consider the example
more carefully, however, we see a caveat that is not discussed in this example and
was also not discussed explicitly by Fearing and Kash [1] in their paper. The problem
with RBPS procedure is that it can potentially allocate new arrival slots, which are
scheduled earlier than the original scheduled arrival time. Since flights cannot arrive
before their original times, in such cases, the allocated arrival slots cannot possibly be
utilized. To see how this can happen, we consider the same original schedule that we
considered in Table 2.1. However, we now modify the priorities received by airlines A
and B from 4 and 12 minutes respectively to 2 and 15 minutes respectively. The new
prioritized times and the corresponding RBPS times are then given in columns 4 and
5 of Table 2.2 respectively. In this example, we see that the RBPS arrival times of
flights B1 and B2 (7:00 PM and 7:10 PM respectively) are earlier than their original
scheduled arrival times (7:10 PM and 7:12 PM respectively) and hence, we cannot
necessarily assume that these slots can be used by flights B1 and B2.
Drawing motivation from the above example, we now try to modify the existing
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Flight Original Schedule RBS Prioritized Schedule RBPS
A1 7:00 PM 7:00 PM 6:58 PM 7:20 PM
A2 7:06 PM 7:10 PM 7:04 PM 7:30 PM
B1 7:10 PM 7:20 PM 6:55 PM 7:00 PM
B2 7:12 PM 7:30 PM 6:57 PM 7:10 PM
Table 2.2: Pathological Example for RBPS: Original, RBS, Prioritized and RBPS
Schedules for a controlled airport with reduced capacity of 1 flight per 10 min
RBPS approach so that it can be used even for such pathological cases. In our
Modified RBPS algorithm, we first arrange the flights in a list in the increasing order
of their prioritized times, αf -pf . We then traverse the list in the same order and search
for the first unallocated available time slot at or after the scheduled arrival time of
the flight and assign the flight to that time slot. We illustrate the implementation
of this algorithm through the example that we considered in Table 2.2. Based on
the Prioritized Schedule column in Table 2.2, we first create Table 2.3, in which rows
are sorted in the increasing order of prioritized times. Going from top to bottom
in this table, the algorithm assigns the first available slot at or after the original
scheduled arrival time (given in column 3 of Table 2.3) to each flight. We therefore
get the new Modified RBPS schedule as shown in column 4 of Table 2.3. Comparing
this with the RBPS schedules given in columns 5, we see that there are considerable
differences between the two allocated schedules. This is because the RBPS assigns
slots in a manner that preserves the order of the prioritized flight times. On the other
hand, the Modified RBPS uses the prioritized schedules to ensure that the original
scheduled arrival times can be assigned to the prioritized flights.
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Flight Prioritized Original Modified RBPS RBS RBPS
B1 6:55 PM 7:10 PM 7:10 PM 7:20 PM 7:00 PM
B2 6:57 PM 7:12 PM 7:20 PM 7:30 PM 7:10 PM
A1 6:58 PM 7:00 PM 7:00 PM 7:00 PM 7:20 PM
A2 7:04 PM 7:06 PM 7:30 PM 7:10 PM 7:30 PM
Table 2.3: Modified RBPS algorithm for a Controlled Airport with
reduced capacity of 1 flight per 10 min
2.3 Motivation for Prioritization - An Example
While the fairness criterion of first-scheduled, first-served is upheld in the RBS
scheme, there is a considerable loss of overall system efficiency in this approach. To
demonstrate this, we consider a simple example consisting of 2 airlines (A and B) and
2 airports (X and Y). In this example, for simplicity, we take into account only two
types of delays: 1) The flight delays associated with the late arrival of an aircraft,
and 2) Passenger delays due to missed connections. We disregard any other types of
possible delays like crew delays, baggage delays, etc.
Airline A is representative of a large low cost, point-to-point carrier like South-
west Airlines and has a seating capacity of 120, while Airline B represents a legacy
carrier like American Airlines, which uses a hub-and-spoke network model and has
a seating capacity of 200. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 list out typical schedules of airlines A
and B respectively at a major, non-hub airport X. Observing the schedules, it can
be easily inferred that from the perspective of making connections, Airline A has a
much tighter schedule as compared to Airline B at Airport X.
Table 2.6 shows the arrival schedule at Airport X, obtained by combining the
arrival schedules for Airlines A and B for the time interval between 5:25 PM to 5:40
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Aircraft Arrival Next flight departure
A1 5:25 PM 6:25 PM
A2 5:30 PM 6:25 PM
A3 5:32 PM 6:40 PM
Table 2.4: Arrival Times of first flights and
departure times of next flights for airline A aircrafts
Aircraft Arrival Next flight departure
B1 5:25 PM 10:50 PM
B2 5:29 PM 10:27 PM
Table 2.5: Arrival times of first flights and departure
times of next flights for airline B aircrafts
PM. In the event of any disruptions due to bad weather, it is assumed that the arrival
rate for Airport X is reduced to 1 flight/10 min and Ration by Schedule is used to
allocate time slots to the flights. This allocation is detailed in the RBS column of
Table 2.6. Assuming that a minimum of 45 min of time difference is required between
two consecutive flight legs for an aircraft, if the original RBS schedule is used, it can
be seen that there will be a total delay of 1 hour and 49 min − 40 min for
Aircraft A2 (=25 min for first flight leg +15 min for second flight leg) corresponding
to its late 5:55PM arrival, 43 min delay for Aircraft A3 (=33 min for first flight
leg+10 min for second flight leg) corresponding its late 6:05 PM arrival, 10 min for
Aircraft B1 and 16 min for Aircraft B2. We note that for both Aircrafts B1 and
B2, their entire delays correspond only to the first flight legs and there are no delays
in the second flight legs since the time difference between the first and second flight
legs is more than one hour. We now summarize the calculations are summarized as
under:
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Aircraft Scheduled Arrival RBS Prioritized Schedule RBPS
A1 5:25 PM 5:25 PM 5:19 PM 5:25 PM
B1 5:25 PM 5:35 PM 5:25 PM 5:45 PM
B2 5:29 PM 5:45 PM 5:29 PM 6:05 PM
A2 5:30 PM 5:55 PM 5:24 PM 5:35 PM
A3 5:32 PM 6:05 PM 5:26 PM 5:55 PM
Table 2.6: Combined Original, Prioritized, RBS and RBPS schedules for Airlines A
and B at Airport X
Flight Delays Associated with RBS Allocation at Airport X
Total delay for Airline A= 83 min (=40 min for A2 + 43 min for A3)
Total delay for Airline B= 26 min (=10 min for B1 + 16 min for B2)
Overall airline delays at Airport X= 83 min + 26 min = 109 min
Passenger Delays Associated with RBS Allocation at Airport X
Total passenger delays for airline A =120*83=9960 min= 166 hours
Total passenger delays for airline B =200*26=5200 min =86.66 hours
Overall passenger delays at Airport X =252.66 hours
It is interesting to note that in this example if the flights had been strategically
prioritized, the overall delays could have been significantly reduced. In particular, we
consider a case in which the arrival times for the first legs of both Aircrafts A2
and A3 have been scheduled 6 minutes prior to their original arrival times. This
causes A2 to be scheduled ahead of B1 and A3 to be scheduled ahead of B2 (see
Prioritized Schedule column in Table 3). In this case, if RBS is implemented on the
new Prioritized schedule to meet the reduced capacity constraints at Airport X, then
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the propagated delay in the second flight legs for both A2 and A3 is avoided (see
RBPS column in Table 3) and the overall delay is reduced to 1 hr and 24 min −
5 min for Aircraft A2, 23 min for Aircraft A3, 20 min for Aircraft B1 and
36 min for Aircraft B2. We further see from the calculations below that the total
passenger delays are also reduced.
Flight Delays Associated with RBPS Allocation at Airport X
Total delay for Airline A= 28 min (5 min for A2 + 23 min for A3)
Total delay for Airline B= 56 min (20 min for B1 +36 min for B2)
Overall airlines delay at Airport X= 28 min + 56 min = 84 min
Passenger Delays Associated with RBPS Allocation at Airport X
Total passenger delay for airline A (RBPS) =120 *28 min= 3360 min = 56 hours
Total passenger delay for airline B (RBPS) = 200*56=11200 min=186.66 hours
Overall passenger delay (RBPS) at Airport X = 242.66 hours
We thus see from this example, that by trading off fairness for system efficiency,
the delays in the system can be reduced. However, there should be some incentive for
Airline B (a legacy carrier) to conform to this (unfair) RBPS schedule. In order to
develop this idea further, we consider another Airport Y which is assumed to be a hub
for Airline B. At any typical airline hub, it is of paramount importance for that airline
to maintain its schedule as much as possible. This is because at a hub, in contrast
to point-to-point carriers, a legacy carrier has a majority of its air traffic consisting
of passengers connecting to other airports rather than completing their journey at
Airport Y itself. Thus, any delays in flight arrivals at hubs result in missed connections
for the passengers or delays in departures for subsequent connecting flights. The
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usefulness of strategic prioritization in such a case is illustrated by further extending
our example.
Table 2.7 lists the arrival times of flights along with their origins for Airline
B (legacy carrier). We assume that all Airline B flights listed in this table have a
capacity of 200 passengers each - of which 80 percent passengers are connecting to
other locations while 20 percent are completing their journeys at Airport Y. We fur-
ther assume that the 80 percent passengers (on each flight) who are connecting to
other locations are split up equally amongst Airline B flights in Table 2.9.
Flight Origin Arrival
B1 Minneapolis (MSP) 9:55 AM
B2 Washington (DCA) 9:55 AM
B3 Chicago (MDW) 9:55 AM
Table 2.7: Airline B (legacy carrier) incoming flights-
with origin and arrival times.
Flight Origin Arrival
A1 Oklahoma City (OKC) 9:45 AM
A2 Pittsburgh (PIT) 9:50 AM
Table 2.8: Airline A (point to point carrier) incoming
flights- with origin and arrival times
Whenever there are bad weather conditions at Airport Y, assuming again
that the airports flight arrival capacity is reduced to 1 flight/10 min, RBS is used
for generating the new schedule. This schedule is described in Table 2.10. We see
that if the original order is maintained and a minimum connecting time of 30 min
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Flight Destination Arrival
B4 Austin (AUS) 10:35 AM
B5 Houston (HOU) 10:40 AM
B6 New Orleans (MSY) 10:45 AM
B7 Dallas (DAL) 10:45 AM
B8 Las Vegas (LAS) 10:48 AM
Table 2.9: Connections for Airline B incoming flights listed in Table 2.7.
is assumed, then all the passengers from the incoming flight B3 (in Table 2.7) will
either miss their connecting flights (if the connecting flights departed on time) or
the connecting flights will have to be delayed to an earliest possible departure time of
10:55 AM in order to allow everyone to make their connections. From the calculations
below, the total airlines delay= 125 min (5 min for Airline A+120 min for Airline
B) and total passenger delay= 164.66 hours (16.66 hours for Airline A passengers
and 148 hours for Airline B passengers) in this scenario.
Flight Destination Arrival RBS Prioritized RBPS
A1 Oklahoma City (OKC) 9:45 AM 9:45 AM 9:45 AM 9:45 AM
A2 Pittsburgh (PIT) 9:50 AM 9:55 AM 9:50 AM 10:25 AM
B1 Minneapolis (MSP) 9:55 AM 10:05 AM 9:49 AM 9:55 AM
B2 Washington (DCA) 9:55 AM 10:15 AM 9:49 AM 10:05 AM
B3 Chicago (MDW) 9:55 AM 10:25 AM 9:49 AM 10:15 AM
Table 2.10: Combined Original, Prioritized, RBS and RBPS schedules for Airlines A
and B at Airport Y
However, we see that if 6 minutes of priority is assigned to each incoming flight of
Airline B (as described in Prioritized Schedule Column of Table 4) and RBPS is
implemented, the total delay is reduced to 80 min (=35min for Airline A and 45 min
for Airline B).
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Flight Delays Associated with RBS Allocation at Airport Y
Total delay for Airline A = 5 min (for A2)
Total delay for Airline B = 10 (for B1) + 20 (for B2) + 30 (for B3) + 20 (for B4) +
15 (for B5)+ 2*10 (for B6 and B7)+ 5 (for B8)=120 min
Overall airlines delay at Airport Y = 5 min + 120 min = 125 min
Flight Delays Associated with RBPS Allocation at Airport Y
Total delay for Airline A = 35 min
Total delay for Airline B = 10 (for B2) + 20 (for B3) + 10 min (for B4) + 5 min (for
B5) = 45 min
Overall airlines delay at Airport Y = 35 min + 45 min = 80 min
Passenger Delays Associated with RBS Allocation at Airport Y
Total passenger delay for Airline A=5*200=16.66 hours (1000 min)
Total passenger delay for Airline B = (0.2*(10+20+30) + 20 (for B4) + 15 (for B5)
+ 2*10 (for B6 and B7) + 7min (forB8))*120 = 148hours (8760 min)
Overall passenger delay at Airport Y = 148+16.66 =164.66 hours
Passenger Delays Associated with RBPS Allocation at Airport Y
Total passenger delay for Airline A = 35*200 min =116.66 hours (7000 min)
Total passenger delay for Airline B = (0.2*(10+20)+10min (for B4) +5min (for B5))
* 120 = 42 hours (2520 min)
Overall passenger delay at Airport Y = 116.66+42 = 158.66 hours
Combining the airline delays on both airports X and Y, we see that strategic
prioritization by airlines reduced the total airline delays by 70 min (25 min for
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Airport X + 45 min for Airport Y). Similarly, the total passenger delays are reduced
by 16 hours (10 hours at Airport X and 6 hours at Airport Y). When we consider the
total delay from the individual airlines perspective, we see that strategic prioritization
reduces the total delay for Airline A by 25 min (55 min gained at Airport X and 30
min lost at Airport Y) and for Airline B by 45 min (75 min gained at Airport Y and
30 min lost at Airport X). Thus, overall both the airlines do better.
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Chapter 3
Model for Prioritization and Theoretical Results
In our discussion so far, we have considered the merits of prioritizing flights
across different airports and showed through a simple example how this could poten-
tially help in reducing both airline as well as passenger delays. However, till now, we
have not yet discussed how the priorities should be allocated to airlines in practice. In
this chapter, therefore, we first describe formally the two-stage game-theoretic model,
developed by Fearing and Kash [1], that provides the framework for allocating pri-
ority minutes to airlines. We further extend the theoretical results for this model to
prove that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the second stage of the model
for the generalized multiple airlines and multiple airports case. In addition, we also
prove that this equilibrium is unique for a reduced case in which there are only two
airlines.
3.1 Priority Allocation to Airlines
In this section, we describe the two stage game theoretic model proposed by
Fearing and Kash [1] for allocating priority minutes to airlines at different airports.In
the first stage of this model, each airline a makes decisions about the number of
flights Nra it wants to schedule at each airport r. In the second stage, all the airlines
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participate in a non-monetary auction, in which they bid points (instead of money)
from a budget of total Ba points allocated to them by the FAA. In our model, we
assume Ba to be proportional to the total number of flights (=
∑
rNra) scheduled by
airline a. The airlines receive priority minutes proportional to the number of points
bra they bid at each airport. These priority minutes are then divided equally among
all the Nra flights scheduled at that airport. Thus, to summarize, the priority prai
received by an airline a at airport r for a flight i scheduled at that airport is given
by the following expression.
prai =
Pr
Nra
bra∑
a′ bra′
(3.1)
In the above expression, the bids bra are subject to the constraints
∑
r bra ≤ Ba
∀a. We note that these constraints compel the airlines to make prioritization trade-
offs across airports.
For describing the payoffs of airlines (players) in this game, the authors assume
that each airline receives a fixed positive utility value V for scheduling a flight and
incurs a disutility cost (equal to the delay) for acquiring delays on the scheduled
flights. In accordance with their original RBPS procedure, Fearing and Kash [1]
consider the flight’s delays or disutility costs to be a step function of the flight’s
priority minutes. To see why this is true, consider the scheduled arrival time of flight
i of airline a at airport r to be a uniformly distributed random variable αrai ∈ [0, Tr].
The original RBPS scheduled time α˜rai of the flight is then calculated in terms of the
fixed slot size zr as
α˜rai = zr
∑
(r,a′,j)6=(r,a,i)
I(αra′j − pra′j ≤ αrai − prai) (3.2)
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Consequently, the delay drai is defined as drai = αrai− α˜rai. From the Eq. 3.2,
it is quite clear that the discontinuities in the delay step function arise whenever a
flight gains sufficient priority minutes to get scheduled ahead of another flight. In
order to avoid the analytical difficulties involved in dealing with step functions, the
model uses the expected utility value as payoffs for the airlines, i.e., it assumes the
payoff urai of airline a for scheduling flight i at airport r to be
urai = Eαr [V − λrdrai] (3.3)
In the above equation, λr denotes the probability of bad weather at airport r. The
total payoffs va for an airline a can thus be calulated as va =
∑
r
∑Nra
i=1 urai. The idea
of taking αrai to be a uniform random variable and expressing the payoffs urai to be
expected utility values is justified on the basis that the airlines make their bidding
decisions on a strategic time scale (i.e. about 6-12 months in advance) and by that
time the schedules of the flights are usually not finalized. Thus, the scheduled arrival
times αrai are assumed to have a uniform distribution. In addition, taking the payoffs
urai to be expected utility values simplifies the complications introduced in the model
due to discontinuous delay functions.
3.2 Theoretical Results
Having discussed the framework of the model, we are now in a position to
describe our results. Fearing and Kash [1] showed the existence of a pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a reduced game with 2 airlines and multiple
airports. In this section, we follow a similar approach to extend their results of
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existence to the more general case with multiple airlines and multiple airports. In
addition, we also derive the conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium using the
diagonal strict concavity condition (Rosen [20]) for the reduced game with 2 airlines
and multiple airports.
3.2.1 Existence of a Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium
For proving the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the second
stage subgame, we use the existence conditions proposed by Debreu [23], Glicks-
berg [24] and Fan [25]. These conditions state that for a strategic-form game <
I, (Si), (ui) >, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists if the strategy sets Si are
non-empty, compact and convex, and the payoff functions ui are continuous in s and
quasi-concave in si.
Since for our game theoretic model, the bids bra of the airlines are subject
to non-negativity constraints, bra ≥ 0 and budget constraints,
∑
r bra ≤ Ba, there-
fore, the strategy sets of the airlines for the second stage subgame are both closed
and bounded (and hence, compact by definition). To prove that the payoff functions
va =
∑
r
∑Nra
i=1 urai are continuous in s and concave si, we first simplify the expression
for urai.
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urai = Eαr [V − λrdrai]
= V − λrEαr [drai]
= V − λrEαr [α˜rai − αrai]
= V − λr(Eαr [α˜rai]− Eαr [αrai])
= V − λr
(
Eαr [α˜rai]−
Tr
2
)
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrEαr [α˜rai]
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrE
[
zr
∑
(r,a′,j)6=(r,a,i)
I(αra′j − pra′j ≤ αrai − prai)
]
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrzr
∑
(r,a′,j)6=(r,a,i)
E[I(αra′j − pra′j ≤ αrai − prai)]
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrzr
∑
(r,a′,j)6=(r,a,i)
P(αrai − αra′j ≥ prai − pra′j)
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrzr
∑
(r,a′,j)6=(r,a,i)
P(αrai − αra′j ≥ prai − pra′j)
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrzr
(∑
j 6=i
P(αrai ≥ αraj) +
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra′∑
j=1
P(αrai − αra′j ≥ prai − pra′j)
)
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrzr
2
(Nra − 1)− λrzr
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra′∑
j=1
P(αrai − αra′j ≥ prai − pra′j)
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrzr
2
(Nra − 1)− λrzr
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra′∑
j=1
(
1− P(αrai − αra′j ≤ prai − pra′j)
)
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrzr
2
(Nra − 1)− λrzr
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra′∑
j=1
(
1− F (τraa′(br))
)
= V + λr
Tr
2
− λrzr
2
(Nra − 1)− λrzr
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra′ + λrzr
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra′∑
j=1
F (τraa′(br)
)
(3.4)
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For the second stage subgame, we note that that all the terms except the last
in the right hand side are constant and thus, for analyzing the second stage game, we
can ignore them and define urai as follows:
urai = λrzr
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra′∑
j=1
F (τraa′(br)) (3.5)
va =
∑
r
Nra∑
i=1
(
λrzr
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra′∑
j=1
F (τraa′(br))
)
=
∑
r
∑
a′ 6=a
Nra∑
i=1
Nra′∑
j=1
λrzrF (τraa′(br))
=
∑
r
∑
a′ 6=a
NraNra′λrzrF (τraa′(br))
(3.6)
Fearing and Kash [1] in their paper derived the analytical expression for the cdf F (τ)
and its derivatives f(τ) and f ′(τ) as follows:
F (τ) =
{
1
2T 2r
(T 2r + 2Trτ − τ 2) τ ≥ 0
(Tr+τ)2
2T 2r
τ < 0
f(τ) =
{
Tr−τ
T 2r
τ ≥ 0
Tr+τ
T 2r
τ < 0
f ′(τ) =

−1
T 2r
τ > 0
1
T 2r
τ < 0
undefined τ = 0
From the above expressions, we see that the payoff functions va are con-
tinuous in s. We now prove that va are also concave over airline a’s strategy set
Sa = (b1a, ..., bra, ..., bna) ∈ Rn of airline a. Since, concavity implies quasiconcavity,
therefore, our last requirement for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium
will be satisfied.
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To prove that va is concave, we show that its Hessian is negative semi-definite.
Evaluating the double derivatives of va with respect to the bids,
va =
∑
r′
∑
a′ 6=a
Nr′aNr′a′λr′zr′F (τr′aa′(br′)) (3.7)
∂va
∂bra
=
∑
a′ 6=a
NraNra′λrzr
(
f(τraa′′)
∂τraa′
∂bra
)
(3.8)
∂2va
∂b2ra
=
∑
a′ 6=a
NraNra′λrzr
(
f(τraa′)
∂2τraa′
∂bra
+ f ′(τraa′)
(
∂τraa′
∂bra
)2)
(3.9)
∂2va
∂brabr′a
= 0 (for r 6= r′) (3.10)
From Eq. 3.10 we see that all the non-diagonal elements (corresponding to
r 6= r′) of the Hessian are 0. Therefore, the Hessian is a diagonal matrix. For
evaluating ∂
2va
∂b2ra
, the diagonal entry in the Hessian corresponding to the row and
column of bid bra), we calculate the relevant terms required in Eq. 3.9.
τraa′ =
Pr∑
a′′ bra′′
(
bra
Nra
− bra′
Nra′
)
(3.11)
∂τraa′
∂bra
=
Pr(∑
a′′ bra′′
)2
(∑
a′′∈A−{a} bra′′
Nra
+
bra′
Nra′
)
(3.12)
∂τraa′
∂bra
= − 2Pr(∑
a′′ bra′′
)3
(∑
a′′∈A−{a} bra′′
Nra
+
bra′
Nra′
)
(3.13)
Case 1: When τraa′ > 0
In this case, f ′(τraa′) = − 1T 2r < 0 and since, f(τaa′) ≥ 0,
∂2τraa′
∂bra
< 0 and
∂τraa′
∂
¯
ra
≥ 0.
Therefore,
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f(τraa′)
∂2τraa′
∂bra
+ f ′(τraa′)
(
∂τraa′
∂bra
)2
≤ 0 (3.14)
Case 2: When τraa′ < 0
We now assume
∑
a′′ bra′′ = k and
(∑
a′′∈A−{a} bra′′
Nra
+
bra′
Nra′
)
= y. Thus, Eq. 3.9 can be
written as
f(τraa′)
∂2τraa′
∂bra
+ f ′(τraa′)
(
∂τraa′
∂bra
)2
=
(
Tr + τraa′
T 2r
)(−2Pry
k3
)
+
(
1
T 2r
)(
Pry
k2
)2
=
Pry
k3T 2r
(
− 2(Tr + τraa′) + Pry
k
)
Expanding the term within brackets on the right hand side,
−2(Tr + τraa′) + Pry
k
= −2
(
Tr +
Pr
k
(
bra
Nra
− bra′
Nra′
))
+ Pr
(∑
a′′∈A−{a} bra′′
Nra
+
bra′
Nra′
)
=
(
− 2Tr − 2Pr
Nra
)
bra +
(
− 2Tr + 3Pr
Nra′
+
Pr
Nra
)
bra′
+
(
− 2Tr + Pr
Nra
) ∑
a′′∈A−{a,a′}
bra′′
Since the bids for airlines are always non-negative, thus, if both −2Tr + PrNra ≤ 0 and
−2Tr + 3PrNra′ +
Pr
Nra
≤ 0, then f(τraa′)∂
2τraa′
∂bra
+ f ′(τraa′)
(
∂τraa′
∂bra
)2
≤ 0.
We notice that for the first condition to hold Pr ≤ Tr2 min(Nra, Nra′) is a sufficient
condition. The second condition Pr ≤ 2TrNra, then becomes redundant if the first
condition is true. From Eq. 3.9, since the condition must be true for all a′ ∈ A −
{a}, therefore the sufficient condition for the Hessian to be negative semi-definite or
equivalently, for va to be concave is that Pr ≤ Tr2 mina′∈A{Nra′} ∀r.
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3.2.2 Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium
Rosen [20] proved that a strategic-form game < I, (Si), (ui) > with strategy
sets Si = {x ∈ Rmi|hi(xi) ≥ 0} has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, if the
following conditions hold true:
1. hi(xi) are concave, which implies that the strategy sets Si are convex sets.
2. ∃ x¯ ∈ Rmi such that hi(x¯i) > 0.
3. The payoff functions (u1, ..., un) are diagonally strict concave, i.e., they satisfy
the condition:
(x¯− x∗)T∇u(x∗) + (x∗ − x¯)T∇u(x¯) > 0
In the above condition,
∇u(x) = [∇1u1(x), ...,∇nun(x)]T and ∇iui(x) =
[∂ui(x)
∂x1i
, ..., ∂ui(x)
∂x
mi
i
]T
Let U(x) denote the jacobian of ∇u(x). Then, a sufficient condition for proving that
the game is diagonally strict concave is to show that (U(x) + UT (x)) is a negative
semidefinite matrix. In our model, we assume that there are m airlines and n airports.
The strategy set of each airline consists of n bids, in which each bid corresponds to
some airport. Thus, for our model, ∇v(b) is a vector of length mn defined as:
∇v(b) =
[
∂v1(b)
∂b11
, ...,
∂v1(b)
∂bn1
, ...,
∂vm(b)
∂b1m
, ...,
∂vm(b)
∂bnm
]T
The jacobian of∇v(b), represented as V (b), is thus an mn x mn matrix. The element
in the matrix (V (b) + V T (b)) corresponding to the row for bid bra and column for
the bid br′a′ can then be calculated as
∂2
∂bra∂br′a′
[va + va′ ].
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3.2.2.1 Two airlines case
We next derive the conditions for the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for the
reduced game with 2 airlines (a and a′) and multiple airports. In this case, the payoff
functions va and va′ in Eq. 3.6 simply reduces to
va =
∑
r
NraNra′λrzrF (τraa′(br))
va′ =
∑
r
NraNra′λrzrF (τra′a(br))
We note from above that
va + va′ =
∑
r
NraNra′λrzr(F (τraa′(br)) + F (τra′a(br)))
=
∑
r
NraNra′λrzr
The last equation comes from the observation that F (τraa′(br)) + F (τra′a(br)) = 1.
For evaluating each entry ∂
2
∂bra∂br′a′
[va + va′ ] of the matrix (V (b) + V
T (b)) for
this reduced game, we consider the following cases:
1. r 6= r′: In this case, entry is 0.
2. r = r′ and a 6= a′ : In this case, va + va′ =
∑
rNraNra′λrzr = a constant
(independent of bids). Therefore, the entry ∂
2
∂bra∂br′a′
[va + va′ ] for this case also will be
0 in the matrix.
3. r = r′ and a = a′ : In this case, ∂
2
∂bra∂br′a′
[va + va′ ] =
∂2(2va)
∂b2ra
.
Fearing and Kash [1] proved that va is strictly concave in bra under the condition
Pr ≤ Tr2 min(Nra, Nra′). Thus, we see that if this condition holds for ∀r, then for the
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two airline case, (V (b) + V T (b)) is basically a diagonal matrix with all elements on
the diagonal less than 0. Hence, (V (b) + V T (b)) is a negative semi-definite matrix.
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Chapter 4
Framework and Airline Strategies for Simulations
In the previous chapters, we described how the central regulator can use a
bidding procedure to assign priorities to the airlines, and further discussed about the
RBPS mechanism for allocating arrival slots to airlines based on prioritized schedules.
In order to perform our simulations, we also need a framework to determine the
responses of the airlines once the slots have been allocated to them. For this, we first
introduce the Airline Disruption Response Model developed by Fearing and Barnhart
[22]. We then describe the strategies used by airlines for determining their bids in
our simulations. Lastly, we discuss the pre-processing steps involved for generating
scenarios and aircraft routings for the simulations.
4.1 Airline Disruption Response Model
To determine the airline responses for our simulations after new arrival slots
have been allocated to them by the RBPS procedure, we make use of a simplified
version of the Airline Disruption Response model developed by Barnhart et al. [7]
and Fearing and Barnhart [22]. This model allows airlines to make recovery de-
cisions by optimizing their schedules through flight swaps and cancellations within
their allocated slots. The most significant simplification that we make in the model
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for performing our simulations is that due to the unavailability of data, we do not
explicitly take into consideration the itineraries of passengers.
Next, we explain the elements of the Airline Disruption Response model in
more detail and discuss some of the simplifications we have made in the model for
carrying out our simulations. In the model, the day of operations is divided into a
set T, consisting of discrete time intervals, {0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1}. For our experiments,
we assume that each of these discrete time intervals correspond to a duration of five
minutes. The set R represents all the system resources which are capacity controlled,
i.e., it includes all the airports and air sectors which have greater projected demands
than their capacities. The resources which are uncontrolled, do not have these imbal-
ances in the demands and capacities, and are not included in R as they do not have
any capacity constraints. The capacity of any controlled resource, r ∈ R over a time
interval t is denoted by brt and is specified in terms of the number of flights that the
resource can hold during the interval t.
The set of all flight legs in the model is denoted by F. For every flight leg
f ∈ F, the number of flight steps in the model are given by |f |. Each flight step in the
original model corresponds to an entry into an air sector or an airport on a flight route.
However, in our simplified model, since we neglect the impact of airspace congestion,
we consider exactly two steps for each flight leg - the first step corresponding to
takeoff from the origin airport and the second one corresponding to landing at the
destination airport. Each flight step i of flight leg f is assigned an earliest start time
α(f, i) and a duration time δ(f, i), both of which are determined from the original
schedules.
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The aircraft type for a flight f is an alphanumeric code designated to aircrafts
by the International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) and is denoted in the model
by p(f). In addition, the origin and destination airports for flight f are denoted by
orig(f) and dest(f) respectively. An aircraft routing s ∈ S represents the sequence
[f1, f2, ..., fn] of flight legs carried out by an aircraft. The arrival and departure steps
for two consecutive flight legs in an aircraft routing must have a minimum turn-
around m(p) between them (in the original model, the minimum turn-around m was
assumed to be a constant instead of being a function of the aircraft type). The first
and last flight legs for each routing s ∈ S are denoted by [s]1 and [s]0 respectively.
In the model, the decision variables yfit are binary and take 0-1 values, depending
on whether the step i for flight f has started by time t or not. The table below
summarizes the description of the model:
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Indices and Sets
t ∈ T set of discrete time intervals,
r ∈ R set of capacity-controlled resources,
f ∈ F set of all flights,
a ∈ A set of all airports,
p ∈ P set of all aircraft types,
s ∈ S set of all aircraft routings,
i ∈ I(f) set of step indices in controlled flight plan for flight f
Data
|f | number of steps in controlled flight plan for flight f ,
r(f, i) resource required by flight step i for flight f ,
α(f, i) earliest start time for flight step i for flight f ,
δ(f, i) processing time of flight step i for flight f ,
p(f) aircraft type for flight f ,
orig(f) origin airport for flight f ,
dest(f) destination airport for flight f ,
[s]0 last flight in an aircraft routing s,
[s]1 first flight in an aircraft routing s,
m(p) minimum turn-around time for an aircraft of type p.
Decision Variables
yfit 1 if flight plan step i for flight f has started by time t and 0 otherwise,
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Constraints
We next describe the constraints used in the model. Constraint 4.1 ensures that for
flight leg f ∈ F and each flight step i ∈ I(f), the sequence of decision variables yfit is
monotonically increasing in t. This basically guarantees that if a flight step started
by time t then it remains completed for all the future time periods.
yfit ≤ yfi(t+1), ∀f ∈ F,∀i ∈ I(f),∀t ∈ {0, ..., T − 2} (4.1)
Constraint 4.2 requires that at the end of the time period, either the flight should
have completed all the intermediate flights steps and reached its destination or it
should have been cancelled and completed none of the flight steps.
yfi(T−1) = yf(i+1)(T−1) ∀f ∈ F, ∀i ∈ I(f) (4.2)
The next constraint 4.3 guarantees that a flight step cannot possibly cannot possibly
start before its earliest start time. Specifically, for our simplified model, this directly
translates into the condition that a flight cannot take-off or land before its original
departure or arrival times respectively.
yfi(α(f,i)−1) = 0 ∀f ∈ F,∀i ∈ I(f) s.t. α(f, i) > 0 (4.3)
The next constraint assumes that flight duration (i.e., time duration between the
take-off step at the origin airport and the landing step at the destination airport)
is a constant and equals α(f, 2) − α(f, 1). This constraint basically ensures that no
airborne delays are assigned in the optimized schedules.
yf(i+1)t = yfi(t−α(f,i+1)+α(f,i)), ∀f ∈ F,∀i ∈ I(f) \ {|f |} (4.4)
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The capacity constraints on controlled resources are enforced through Constraint
4.5. In this constraint, the term
(
yfit − yfi(t−δ(f,i))
)
denotes whether the controlled
resource r is being used at time t for flight step i or not.∑
{(f,i):r(f,i)=rˆ}
(
yfit − yfi(t−δ(f,i))
) ≤ brˆt, ∀rˆ ∈ R,∀t ∈ T (4.5)
Constraints 4.9 and 4.10 ensure that flow balance is maintained for all aircrafts of
type p ∈ P at each airport a ∈ A. However, before we look at those constraints in
detail, we first define new variables ∆(a, p, t) which represent the difference between
the number of aircrafts of type p arriving at an airport a by time t −m(p) and the
number of aircrafts of type p leaving the airport a by time t. We also note that
if initially the number of aircrafts of type p at an airport a is zero, then ∆(a, p, t)
represents the number of aircrafts of type p available for departure at time t from
airport a.
∆(a, p, t) ,
∑
{f∈F:dest(f)=a,p(f)=p}
yf |f |(t−m(p)) −
∑
{f∈F:orig(f)=a,p(f)=p}
yf1t (4.6)
For specifying the flow balance constraints, the model also needs to imconstraints
which ensure that the number of aircrafts originating from and terminating at an
airport (at the beginning and end of the day respectively) remains conserved. To
achieve this objective, the model defines two constants, n(a, p, t) and n(a, p), both of
which are calculated from the original flight schedules. While n(a, p, t) represents the
count of routings s s of aircraft type p for which the first flights [s]1 originate from
airport a before time t, n(a, p) denotes the number of routings of type p aircrafts
whose final flight legs [s]0 have airport a as destination.
n(a, p, t) , |{s ∈ S : orig([s]1) = a, p([s]1) = p, α([s]1, 1) ≤ t}| (4.7)
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n(a, p) , |{s ∈ S : dest([s]0)) = a, p([s]0) = p}| (4.8)
Using the variables and constants defined above, we can now specify the two
flow balance constraints quite succinctly. The first flow balance constraint (constraint
4.9) ensures that for any airport a, the number of departures of type p aircrafts till
time t cannot exceed the sum of the following two quantities: (1) the number of type p
aircrafts arriving at airport a by time (t−m(p)), and (2) the number of type p aircrafts
stationed at airport a since the beginning of the day and scheduled to begin their
first flight legs from airport a before time t. The second constraint (constraint 4.10),
on the other hand, ascertains that the end of day flow conservation requirements are
satisfied. It states that the total number of type p aircrafts at the end of day at an
airport a (denoted by n(a, p)) must be equal to the sum of type p aircrafts initially
stationed at airport a at the beginning of the day (denoted by n(a, p, T ) ) and the net
inflow of type p aircrafts into airport a during the day (denoted by ∆(a, p, T +m)).
∆(a, p, t) + n(a, p, t) ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A,∀p ∈ P,∀t ∈ T (4.9)
∆(a, p, T +m) + n(a, p, T ) = n(a, p), ∀a ∈ A,∀p ∈ P (4.10)
Eq. 4.11 and 4.12 define the constraints on the cancellation and delay decision vari-
ables. Flight f is cancelled if yf |f |(T−1) = 0, i.e., if by the end of the time period, the
final flight step has not started. The delay d(f) is the difference between the actual
arrival time and scheduled arrival time of a flight. For all t greater than or equal to
the actual arrival time yf |f |t = 1. Thus, by subtracting off yf |f |t for those times from
T − α(f, |f |), the delay is obtained. From constraint 4.12, we see that if a flight is
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cancelled, then the delay d(f) = 0. This is because for a cancelled flight yf |f |t = 0 ∀t.
cx(f) = 1− yf |f |(T−1) (4.11)
d(f) = (T − α(f, |f |))yf |f |(T−1) −
T−1∑
t=α(f,|f |)
yf |f |t (4.12)
Objective function
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the simplified version of the Airline
Disruption Response model that we consider does not explicitly take into account the
effect of passenger delay and missed connections costs. Thus, the objective function
for our simplified model is made up of only two components: (1) estimated flight
cancellation costs, and (2) superlinear flight operating costs associated with flight
delays. This is in contrast with the original Airline Disruption Response model, in
which the cancellation costs term was replaced by a cancellation benefits term for
the airlines (for not having operate the cancelled flights) and cancellation costs were
incorporated implicitly within an additional third term, which estimated passenger
costs.
We now define the cancellation costs term
gcanc(ν) = ν
∑
f∈F
[ns(f)cx(f)] (4.13)
Here, the estimated cancellation costs are controlled by the parameter ν, which deter-
mines the per seat cancellation cost taking into account the passenger costs associated
with flight cancellations as well as the cancellation benefits of airlines for not having
to operate the cancelled flight.
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Fearing and Barnhart [22] argue that flight delays lead to operational costs due
to several different reasons like missed connections, passenger delays, baggage delays,
crew rescheduling, aircraft maintenance rescheduling, etc. Since in practice, only the
airlines are privy to the internal costs associated with such operations, therefore, to
estimate these costs, they use a superlinear cost function for approximation. The use
of a superlinear function to model the costs is based on the notion that an increase in
flight delays leads to a non-linear increase in operational costs. In the superlinear cost
function defined in Eq. 4.14, the costs increase linearly with delay till the threshold
of ψ is reached. Subsequent increases in delay above the threshold value results in a
piecewise linear increase in costs, such that the slope of each piece is greater than its
previous piece by a factor of λ. The parameter ρ ∈ N+ determines the length of each
piece.
cft = min{t− α(f, |f |), ψ}+
t−α(f,|f |)−ψ∑
=1
λceil(

ρ
) (4.14)
Thus, using the superlinear delay cost function, the operational costs function
gops(ν) is now defined in Eq. 4.15.
gops(ν) = ζ
∑
f∈F
[
ns(f)
T−1∑
t=α(f,|f |)
cft(yf |f |t − yf |f |(t−1))
]
(4.15)
To take into consideration the dependence of operational costs on the number of
passengers on board on a flight, the parameter 0 < ζ < 1 is used to scale the seating
capacities according to the expected demands. We note that for an operational flight
yf |f |t − yf |f |(t−1) = 1 only for the time interval in which the final flight step |f | is
completed and thus, delay cost cft is imposed only for that step. We also see that
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if a flight f is cancelled, then yf |f |t = 0 for all t and hence, no operational costs are
incurred for cancelled flights.
4.2 Scenario Construction
For constructing the historical scenarios, we use an approach similar to the
ones described in Barnhart et al. [7] and Fearing and Barnhart [22]. We first obtain
the flight schedule data from the Flight Schedule Monitor(FSM), which is an ATFM
decision support tool developed by Metron Aviation [26]. Among its several func-
tionalities, the FSM provides data regarding flights’ estimated arrival and departure
times for all the transportation resources (airports and air sectors) that are encoun-
tered on the flight routes. However, since our simulations do not take the effect of air
sectors into account, we consider the FSM data only to determine the departure and
arrival times of flights at their origin and destination airports respectively. We obtain
this data for a single day (April 23, 2007) of clear weather operations to estimate
the planned flight schedules in the Official Airline Guide. As described in Fearing
and Barnhart [22], we then subset the data thus obtained by considering only the 20
airlines (refer to Table 4.1) which are represented in the Airline Service Quality Per-
formance (ASQP) 2007 dataset and also restricting the origin-destination flight routes
to include only those that are in the T-100 Domestic Segment database. This reduces
the number of flights from around 38,000 in our original dataset to around 16000 in
the subset dataset. Metron Aviation’s FSM data also provides information about the
GDP programs which have been implemented previously. This data contains all the
relevant details about the GDP program like the program resource, reporting and im-
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Airline Codes Airline Names
9E Pinnacle Airlines
AA American Airlines
AQ Aloha Airlines
AS Alaska Airlines
B6 JetBlue Airways
CO Continental Airlines
DL Delta Airlines
EV Atlantic Southeast Airlines
F9 Frontier Airlines
FL AirTran Airways
HA Hawaiin Airlines
MQ American Eagle Airlines
NW Northwest Airlines
OH Comair
OO SkyWest Airlines
UA United Airlines
US US Airways
WN Southwest Airlines
XE ExpressJet Airlines
YV Mesa Airlines
Table 4.1: IATA codes for the airlines considered in simulations
plementation time, duration and capacity for each 15 minute interval. For performing
our simulations, we consider the FSM data for the same set of 10 representative TFM
scenarios, which were considered by Barnhart et al. [7] and Fearing and Barnhart [22].
However, since we want to study the impact of prioritization at individual airports,
we further break each TFM scenario on the basis of the GDP resources. The details
of the 40 GDP scenarios thus obtained are given in Appendix A. The corresponding
information regarding the airports considered in these scenarios are provided in Table
4.2.
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Airport Code Airport Name
ATL HartsfieldJackson Atlanta International Airport
DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
EWR Newark Liberty International Airport
IAD Washington Dulles International Airport
JFK John F. Kennedy International Airport
LGA LaGuardia Airport
MDW Chicago Midway International Airport
ORD Chicago O’Hare International Airport
PHL Philadelphia International Airport
SFO San Francisco International Airport
Table 4.2: Airports considered for constructing simulation scenarios
4.3 Generating Aircraft Routings
For tracking an aircraft’s routings, we need information about its tail number.
The flights in the FSM data, however, do not have tail numbers of aircrafts associated
with them, and while it is possible to match the tail numbers of aircrafts using the
ASQP database, it is sometimes found that the tail numbers provided in the ASQP
database are incorrect. This results in the generation of aircraft routings, which are
invalid or infeasible. Fearing and Barnhart [22] define a valid or feasible routing s to
be one for which the following conditions hold true:
1. The origin airport for a flight leg is the same as the destination airport of the
previous flight leg in the routing, i.e., orig([s]k+1) = dest([s]k) ∀k.
2. The aircraft type remains the same for all flights in the routing, i.e., p([s]1) =
p([s]2) = ... = p([s]0).
3. The minimum turnaround time m(p([s]0)) is maintained between any two flight
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legs, i.e., α([s]k+1, 1) ≥ α([s]k, |[s]k|) +m(p([s]0)) ∀k.
For generating valid aircraft routings, we use the procedure described by Fear-
ing and Barnhart [22]. We first generate the planned aircraft routings, based on
the tail numbers in ASQP database. In case of discrepancies, we select the longest
sub-sequence compatible with our validity rules and greedily assign the inconsistent
flights to the aircraft routings which are compatible. Following this method, we get
in all 4451 aircraft routings for the 16,129 FSM flights scheduled in the 24-hour time
period.
4.4 Airline Bidding Strategies
For performing our simulations, we consider two different bidding strategies
for the airlines. In the first strategy, we assume the airline bids at an airport to be
proportional to the total number of seats on all of their respective incoming flights at
that airport, i.e., we assume
bra ∝
∑
{f∈Fa:dest(f)=r}
ns(f) (4.16)
In the above equation, Fa denotes the set of all airline a flights. Using this strategy, we
obtain the bids as shown in Table 4.3. From the table, we observe that for air carriers
operating on a hub-and-spoke model, the strategy of allocating bids proportionally
to the number of seats on all of their incoming flights at an airport, corresponds
to a great extent to the strategy of prioritizing their hub airports. For example, in
Table 4.3 we see that both Delta (IATA Code: DL) and United (IATA Code: UA)
Airlines have a significant portion of their bid budgets allocated to their respective
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hubs in Atlanta (IATA Code: ATL) and Chicago (IATA Code: ORD). We have
already discussed this idea in considerable detail through our hypothetical example
in Section 2.3 and shown that significant cost benefits can be achieved using this
strategy for both passengers as well as airlines.
The second strategy that we use is based on the concept of delay multipliers
developed by Beatty et al. [21]. The delay multiplier is a metric used to evaluate the
propagation of an initial flight delay from a bottleneck airport to other airports in the
network due to connection delays. The delays in flight connections could be due to
different reasons like aircraft delays, passenger delays, crew delays or baggage delays.
Due to the unavailability of data, however, in our simulations, we consider only the
effect of the late arrival of an aircraft for calculating the delay multipliers. Beatty
et al. [21] define the delay multiplier DM for a flight as :
DM =
I +D
I
(4.17)
where I= Initial delay and D=Down line delay (both in minutes). For clarity, con-
sider the following example. Suppose that at JFK, an aircraft gets delayed by 1 hour.
Because of this initial delay, assume that the next 2 flight legs for the aircraft get
delayed by 45 and 15 minutes respectively. Then, according to the above definition,
I = 60 min, D = 45 + 15 = 60 min and the delay multiplier, DM = 2. Using
this definition, the authors in their paper had studied the temporal variation of de-
lay multipliers during the day based on actual American Airlines crew and aircraft
schedules.
We see from Eq. 4.17 that DM is a measure of delay propagation for an
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individual flight. However, in order to employ this concept to determine the strategies
for airline bids at each airport, we need a metric that provides the airlines a measure of
delay propagation for all of their flights at each airport. In addition, we also need this
metric to take into account the fact that airlines have a flexibility to optimize their
schedules within the RBS allocated slots. We therefore, use the Airline Disruption
Response model and combine it with a Monte Carlo simulation approach to redefine
the delay multiplier λωr(ω)a as follows:
λωr(ω)a =
∑
f∈Fa
(d∗ω(f) + γ cx∗ω(f))∑
{f∈Fa:dest(f)=r(ω)}
(RBSω(f)− α(f, |f |)) (4.18)
In the above equation, λωr(ω)a denotes the delay multiplier for airline a at con-
trolled airport r(ω) under scenario ω. d∗ω(f) and cx∗ω(f) respectively represent the
optimal values of decision variables d(f) and cx(f) obtained from the Airline Disrup-
tion Response model for scenario ω. RBSω(f) is the schedule obtained by applying
RBS to the original schedule at controlled airport r(ω) under scenario ω. γ denotes
the penalty parameter associated with the cancellation of flight f . In our experiments,
we take γ = 6 hours, i.e., we assume the delay associated with a cancelled flight to be
equivalent to 6 hours. We can thus observe from Eq. 4.18 that λωr(ω)a is the ratio of
the total propagated delays (over the airports network) to the total incoming delays
for an airline a at a reduced capacity airport r under the GDP scenario ω. Since
the propagated delay is atleast as large as the initial delay, therefore, λωr(ω)a is always
greater than or equal to 1.
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We now define the parameter λra in terms of λ
ω
r(ω)a as follows:
λra =
∑
{ω∈Ω: r(ω)=r}
λωr(ω)aN
ω
r(ω)a∑
{ω∈Ω: r(ω)=r}
Nωr(ω)a
(4.19)
In the above equation, Nωra denotes the number of flights of airline a affected at
airport r during GDP scenario ω. Since, λra is a weighted average of the λ
ω
r(ω)a,
which are all greater than or equal to 1. Therefore, the values of λra are also greater
than 1. The values of λra, obtained through our simulations on the 40 representative
scenarios are summarised in Table 4.4. We see that for many of the airlines and
airports, the delay multipliers are undefined. This can be explained on the basis of
equations 4.18 and 4.19. Whenever the RBS allocated schedule is the same as the
original airline schedule, the initially allocated delay itself is zero and hence, no delay
propagation occurs over the network. Therefore, the delay multiplier λra is undefined.
Similarly, from Eq. 4.19, we see that if no flights are scheduled for an airlines (more
specifically, during the duration of the GDP Scenario), then none of its flights will
have to be rescheduled. In this case again, the initially allocated delay is 0 and the
delay multiplier is undefined. We also observe from Table 4.4 that some of the delay
multipliers have very large values. This is due to the fact that we impose a large
penalty of γ on flight cancellations.
For determining the bids for airlines based on the delay multipliers approach,
we first note that larger values of delay multipliers correspond to larger delay prop-
agation over the network. Therefore, in order to reduce delays, we assume that the
airlines set their bids bra to be proportional to the delay multipliers λra. The bids
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obtained by implementing this procedure are given in Table 4.6. While evaluating
the bids for airlines which have undefined delay multipliers for all the scenarios (for
example, airlines 9E and HA), we place zero bids at those airports where they have
no flights scheduled (refer to Table 4.5), but split the bids equally among all the other
airports where they have flights scheduled. This is because even though flights may
not have initial delays due to disruptions, after prioritization these airlines may incur
delays because of the priorities which other airlines gain. For those airlines, which
have zero flights scheduled at all the disruption airports (for example, airline AQ),
we simply set all the bids to be zero.
Based on their bids, the airlines receive priorities according to the expression
given in Eq. 3.1. As we had discussed in section 1.2, Pr, the pool of prioritization
points assigned to airport r, provides regulator the ability to control the level of
prioritization at different airports. In order to see the effect of varying Pr, we consider
two different values for it. In the first case, we assume Pr =
∑
aNra, while in the
second we set Pr = 2
∑
aNra. The rationale behind expressing Pr as a multiple of Nra
is that we assume that the regulator assigns some priority points (in our experiments,
1 and 2 points respectively) for each flight scheduled at an airport, which depending
on the bids get divided differently among the different airlines. Based on the two
strategies used for bid allocation (one using the number of seats as a criterion and
the using second delay multipliers), the number of priority minutes assigned are given
in Tables 4.7 - 4.10. Comparing the two strategies based on the number of priority
minutes in these tables, we see that when number of seats is used as a criterion, the
priorities assigned are relatively smaller but are allocated at more airports. This is
59
because under the number of seats criterion, the airlines bid at all the airports where
their flights are scheduled. On the other hand, the delay multipliers criterion favours
higher bidding for some airports (where multipliers are larger). We note here that
both the strategies have their own advantages. While bidding higher at fewer airports
provides airlines more chances of gaining priorities at those airports, the strategy of
placing smaller bids at a larger number of airports prevents airlines from losing out
priorities to other airlines.
60
A
IR
P
O
R
T
S
A
IR
L
IN
E
S
9
E
A
A
A
Q
A
S
B
6
C
O
D
L
E
V
F
9
F
L
H
A
M
Q
N
W
O
H
O
O
U
A
U
S
W
N
X
E
Y
V
A
T
L
0
1.
3
0
0
0
1
0.
8
0.
9
3.
6
0.
8
0
2.
2
2.
7
1.
6
3
0.
8
3.
5
0
2
1.
8
D
C
A
7.
4
0.
7
0
3.
1
0
0.
6
0.
4
0.
4
2
0.
5
0
0.
6
1.
8
0.
8
0
0.
4
1.
8
0
1.
1
0
E
W
R
0
0.
8
0
3.
6
0.
6
0.
8
0.
5
0.
7
0
0.
5
0
0.
7
1.
5
1.
3
0
0.
5
2.
2
0
1.
3
0.
8
IA
D
8.
9
0.
9
0
0
0.
6
0
0.
5
0
0
0.
5
0
0.
9
1.
9
1
0
0.
6
2.
1
2.
5
1.
3
0.
9
J
F
K
0
1.
4
0
0
0.
8
0.
8
0.
7
0
0
0
0
1
2.
3
1.
3
0
0.
7
3
0
1.
7
1.
6
L
G
A
9.
4
0.
9
0
0
0.
7
0.
8
0.
5
0.
5
2.
5
0.
6
0
0.
8
2.
3
1.
1
0
0.
6
0
0
1.
3
0.
9
M
D
W
0
0
0
0
0
0.
3
0
0.
3
1.
1
0.
2
0
0
0.
7
0.
4
0
0
0
1.
1
0.
6
0
O
R
D
0
0.
9
0
3.
4
0.
6
0.
7
0.
5
0.
7
0
0
0
1.
1
1.
8
1.
2
1.
6
0.
6
2.
8
0
1.
4
1
P
H
L
4.
8
0.
5
0
0
0
0.
4
0.
3
0.
4
1.
3
0.
3
0
0
1.
1
0.
7
0.
7
0.
3
1.
2
1.
4
0.
6
0
S
F
O
0
0.
9
0
2.
8
0
0.
8
0.
6
0.
4
2.
1
0.
5
21
.6
0.
7
2.
2
0
0.
9
0.
5
2.
1
0
0
0.
7
T
ab
le
4.
7:
P
ri
or
it
y
m
in
u
te
s
b
as
ed
on
n
u
m
b
er
of
se
at
s
as
si
gn
ed
to
ea
ch
fl
ig
h
t
w
h
en
P
r
=
∑ aN
r
a
.
61
A
IR
P
O
R
T
S
A
IR
L
IN
E
S
9
E
A
A
A
Q
A
S
B
6
C
O
D
L
E
V
F
9
F
L
H
A
M
Q
N
W
O
H
O
O
U
A
U
S
W
N
X
E
Y
V
A
T
L
0
2.
6
0
0
0
2
1.
7
1.
7
7.
3
1.
7
0
4.
4
5.
3
3.
3
6
1.
6
6.
9
0
4.
1
3.
5
D
C
A
14
.8
1.
4
0
6.
2
0
1.
2
0.
8
0.
8
4
1
0
1.
3
3.
5
1.
7
0
0.
8
3.
6
0
2.
3
0
E
W
R
0
1.
7
0
7.
3
1.
3
1.
6
1.
1
1.
3
0
1
0
1.
4
3.
1
2.
6
0
1
4.
3
0
2.
5
1.
6
IA
D
17
.8
1.
8
0
0
1.
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1.
9
3.
8
2
0
1.
2
4.
3
5
2.
7
1.
8
J
F
K
0
2.
8
0
0
1.
5
1.
6
1.
4
0
0
0
0
2.
1
4.
7
2.
6
0
1.
4
6.
1
0
3.
4
3.
2
L
G
A
18
.9
1.
8
0
0
1.
5
1.
5
1
1.
1
5.
1
1.
2
0
1.
6
4.
6
2.
1
0
1.
3
0
0
2.
7
1.
9
M
D
W
0
0
0
0
0
0.
6
0
0.
6
2.
1
0.
5
0
0
1.
5
0.
9
0
0
0
2.
2
1.
2
0
O
R
D
0
1.
8
0
6.
8
1.
3
1.
5
1
1.
5
0
0
0
2.
1
3.
6
2.
4
3.
1
1.
2
5.
5
0
2.
8
1.
9
P
H
L
9.
6
0.
9
0
0
0
0.
9
0.
6
0.
8
2.
6
0.
6
0
0
2.
3
1.
5
1.
4
0.
5
2.
5
2.
7
1.
2
0
S
F
O
0
1.
8
0
5.
7
0
1.
6
1.
2
0.
9
4.
1
1.
1
43
.2
1.
4
4.
3
0
1.
8
1.
1
4.
3
0
0
1.
5
T
ab
le
4.
8:
P
ri
or
it
y
m
in
u
te
s
b
as
ed
on
n
u
m
b
er
of
se
at
s
as
si
gn
ed
to
ea
ch
fl
ig
h
t
w
h
en
P
r
=
2
∑ aN
r
a
.
62
A
IR
P
O
R
T
S
A
IR
L
IN
E
S
9
E
A
A
A
Q
A
S
B
6
C
O
D
L
E
V
F
9
F
L
H
A
M
Q
N
W
O
H
O
O
U
A
U
S
W
N
X
E
Y
V
A
T
L
0
3
0
0
0
3
0.
2
0.
2
0
0.
3
0
41
.2
1.
7
2.
6
9.
1
7.
7
6.
2
0
9
16
.3
D
C
A
3.
9
0
0
0
0
1.
4
0.
5
5.
5
2.
4
4
0
1.
1
0.
7
0.
9
0
1
3
0
0
0
E
W
R
0
2.
4
0
12
.2
1.
6
0.
1
3.
4
11
.8
0
11
.2
0
8
1.
4
8.
9
0
2.
8
2.
7
0
0.
4
0
IA
D
6.
2
4.
9
0
0
0.
7
0
2.
4
0
0
0
0
9.
4
2.
4
1.
1
0
0.
3
0
3.
9
2.
2
0.
1
J
F
K
0
2.
7
0
0
0.
1
0
0.
8
0
0
0
0
2.
1
8.
4
0.
4
0
2.
3
3.
5
0
0
5.
6
L
G
A
7.
4
0.
5
0
0
1.
8
1.
7
0.
4
0
5.
3
2.
3
0
0.
5
1.
1
0.
4
0
1.
1
0
0
9.
9
3.
2
M
D
W
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.
2
0
0
O
R
D
0
0.
3
0
17
.6
6.
8
3
8.
3
76
.6
0
0
0
0.
3
1.
6
3.
8
1.
5
0.
3
2.
9
0
19
0.
3
P
H
L
2.
1
0
0
0
0
0
1.
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.
7
0
2.
1
0
0
S
F
O
0
1.
2
0
1.
5
0
3.
1
0
0
1.
9
0
20
.4
0
5.
1
0
1.
1
0.
2
1.
8
0
0
0
T
ab
le
4.
9:
P
ri
or
it
y
m
in
u
te
s
b
as
ed
on
d
el
ay
m
u
lt
ip
li
er
s
as
si
gn
ed
to
ea
ch
fl
ig
h
t
w
h
en
P
r
=
∑ aN
r
a
.
63
A
IR
P
O
R
T
S
A
IR
L
IN
E
S
9
E
A
A
A
Q
A
S
B
6
C
O
D
L
E
V
F
9
F
L
H
A
M
Q
N
W
O
H
O
O
U
A
U
S
W
N
X
E
Y
V
A
T
L
0
6.
1
0
0
0
6
0.
3
0.
5
0
0.
6
0
82
.3
3.
4
5.
1
18
.1
15
.4
12
.5
0
17
.9
32
.7
D
C
A
7.
7
0
0
0
0
2.
8
1.
1
11
4.
9
7.
9
0
2.
2
1.
4
1.
7
0
2
6
0
0
0
E
W
R
0
4.
7
0
24
.3
3.
1
0.
3
6.
8
23
.6
0
22
.5
0
16
.1
2.
8
17
.9
0
5.
6
5.
4
0
0.
7
0
IA
D
12
.3
9.
7
0
0
1.
4
0
4.
9
0
0
0
0
18
.8
4.
8
2.
3
0
0.
5
0
7.
8
4.
5
0.
1
J
F
K
0
5.
4
0
0
0.
3
0
1.
6
0
0
0
0
4.
2
16
.8
0.
7
0
4.
6
7.
1
0
0
11
.2
L
G
A
14
.9
1
0
0
3.
6
3.
4
0.
8
0
10
.5
4.
6
0
1
2.
2
0.
9
0
2.
1
0
0
19
.8
6.
4
M
D
W
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.
5
0
0
O
R
D
0
0.
7
0
35
.1
13
.6
6.
1
16
.6
15
3.
3
0
0
0
0.
6
3.
2
7.
6
2.
9
0.
6
5.
8
0
38
0.
6
P
H
L
4.
2
0
0
0
0
0
2.
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.
4
0
4.
2
0
0
S
F
O
0
2.
5
0
2.
9
0
6.
2
0
0
3.
8
0
40
.7
0
10
.2
0
2.
1
0.
4
3.
6
0
0
0
T
ab
le
4.
10
:
P
ri
or
it
y
m
in
u
te
s
b
as
ed
on
d
el
ay
m
u
lt
ip
li
er
s
as
si
gn
ed
to
ea
ch
fl
ig
h
t
w
h
en
P
r
=
2
∑ aN
r
a
.
64
Chapter 5
Results and Conclusions
In the previous chapter, we had completed our discussion regarding the frame-
work used for carrying out our experiments and additionally, described two different
strategies the airlines can use for determining their bids. We also saw that depend-
ing on the pool of priority points set by the regulator, the airlines received different
priority allocations. In this chapter, we analyze the results that we obtain from these
prioritized schedules and draw conclusions drawn from the thesis.
5.1 Simulation Results
In our experiments, based on the priority minutes given in Tables 4.7 - 4.10,
we generate prioritized schedules by subtracting off the number of priority minutes
allocated for each flight, as described in 2.2. For rationing slots at reduced capacity
airports, however, instead of using the Modified RBPS algorithm, we directly apply
RBS on the prioritized schedules and reschedule the flights at their original scheduled
times if the allocated slots obtained by this procedure are found to be earlier than
the original scheduled times.
We now discuss the parameters used in the Airline Disruption Response Model
to determine the airlines’ optimal slots for their flights. As discussed in Section 4.1,
65
the objective function is defined by five parameters: ν (the penalty cost per seat for
a cancelled flights), ψ (the operating cost threshold), ρ (length of each piece in the
super-linear operating cost), λ (the growth factor for the slope of each piece in the
operating cost) and ζ (the scaling factor for the number of seats based on expected
demands). Based on the aggressive approach described in Fearing and Barnhart [22],
we set the values of the parameters to be ζ=0.5, ψ=6, λ=1.5 and ρ=3. However, since
ν in our model represents the penalty cost, therefore we set ν=54. This is based on
the assumption that the delay for a passenger due to cancelled flight is around 6 hours
(=72 five-minute intervals) and the load factor of flights is between 0.8-0.85. Taking
this into account and assuming a cost benefit of 6 units (as explained in Fearing and
Barnhart [22]), we get ν ≈ 54.
Once the slots have been rationed based on the reduced capacities of the
airports, we use the Airline Disruption Response Model to evaluate the costs of airlines
over all the 40 scenarios. Table 5.1 shows the results that we get from optimization.
In this table, the No Prioritization column corresponds to the Total Costs obtained
by simply applying RBS on the Original Schedule (without any prioritization) and
optimizing the schedules using the Airline Disruption Response Model. The next four
columns show the optimized costs for schedules prioritized on the basis of number
of seats and delay multipliers respectively. We first note from these columns that
for both the prioritization schemes, the total costs for each airline over all the 40
scenarios is less than or equal to the their original costs (given in No Prioritization
column). This clearly shows that by prioritizing their flights, none of the airlines are
made worse-off. In fact, as can be seen from Percentage Reduction in Costs column,
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nearly all of the airlines are strictly better off. From a viewpoint of the regulator, we
see that by increasing the pool of points Pr from 1 min/scheduled flight to 2 min/per
scheduled flight at airport r, the prioritized costs decrease even further for both the
strategies. Considering the combined costs of all the airlines together, we see that
prioritizing flights by the number of seats results in 10.4% and 17.6% decreases in
costs for Pr = 1 min/flight and Pr = 2 min/flight respectively. The corresponding
numbers for the strategy involving delay multipliers are 7.6% for Pr = 1 min/flight
and 13.6% for Pr = 2 min/flight.
From the simulations, we also note that the prioritization strategy based on
the number of seats consistently does better than the one based on delay multipliers.
Based on our discussions in the last chapter, this suggests that allocating relatively
lower bids at a larger number of airports works better than allocating very high bids
at only a few airports. In order to study the effect of airline bids on its internal
costs, we plot figures 5.1-5.4, which show the scatter plots of the percentage change
in original costs with the per flight airline bids at each airport for the two strategies
at the two different Pr values. Each point on the scatterplot corresponds to the
percentage change in the cost to an airline based on its per flight bid at some airport.
We see from all the the plots there appears to be a strong positive correlation (varying
from 0.4 to 0.7) between the percentage decrease in internal costs and the per flight
bids of an airline at an airport. We note it is the per flight bid (not just the overall
bid) of an airline at an airport, which is the more relevant factor in influencing flight
costs. This is quite intuitive since the priority minutes for an airline are equally split
among its flights at all the airports.
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Figure 5.1: Scatter Plot of Percentage Reduction in Cost v/s Airline Bids per Flight
for Pr =
∑
aNra (=1 flight/min)
Figure 5.2: Scatter Plot of Percentage Reduction in Cost v/s Airline Bids per Flight
for Pr = 2
∑
aNra (=2flights/min)
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Figure 5.3: Scatter Plot of Percentage Reduction in Cost v/s Airline Bids per Flight
for Pr =
∑
aNra (=1 flight/min)
Figure 5.4: Scatter Plot of Percentage Reduction in Cost v/s Airline Bids per Flight
for Pr = 2
∑
aNra (=2flights/min)
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5.2 Conclusions and Scope for Future Study
In this thesis, we explored and developed in detail the strategic prioritization
framework proposed by Fearing and Kash [1] for airline scheduling during disrup-
tions. Due to fairness considerations, the airline rescheduling procedure currently
implemented by the FAA does not take into consideration the individual preferences
of the airlines while allocating the initial schedules. This causes several airline op-
erations to be adversely affected whenever disruptions occur at airports due to bad
weather conditions or severe air traffic congestion.
The strategic prioritization framework, which is a simple extension of the cur-
rent system in operation, provides the airlines opportunities to prioritize the airports
according to their needs. The allocation of priorities in this framework takes place
through a two stage non-monetary game in which the airlines bid for priorities using
points allocated to them by the regulator. In this thesis, we first developed moti-
vation about why such a framework could work when implemented in practice. We
then extended the theoretical results for this framework to show that that it possesses
several desirable properties in the second stage of the game, like the existence of a
Nash equilibrium for the general multiple airlines and multiple airports case, and the
uniqueness of the equilibrium for the two airlines and multiple airports case.
A major contribution of the thesis was that we were able to show through com-
puter simulations on historical flight data that strategic prioritization yielded lower
operational costs for all the airlines. For our analysis, we considered two different
bidding strategies for the airlines. The first strategy was based on simply setting
the priorities proportional to the number of total seats on all incoming flights at
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an airport. The second strategy involved extending the concept of delay multipliers
developed by Beatty et al. [21] using the Airline Disruption Response model based
on Monte Carlo simulations. Using these two different bidding strategies, significant
reductions (upto 17.6%) were achieved in the total operational cost of the airlines.
The strategic prioritization approach showed promising results through sim-
ulations on our representative historical scenarios. However, a key limitation in our
approach was that we did not implement the Modified RBPS algorithm that we devel-
oped in Section 2.2 for our simulations. This potentially led to some of the capacity
constraints being violated for the reduced capacity airport. It would be interesting
to analyze the effect which the implementation of Modified RBPS algorithm has on
the operational costs of the airlines. Another limitation in our approach was that the
scenarios that we used to simulate the impact of priority minutes consisted of only one
controlled airport. While for determining the delay multipliers, the approach of using
a single controlled airport per scenario is probably the best, for studying the effect of
prioritization overall, the multiple resource scenarios as constructed in Fearing and
Barnhart [22] might be more useful to analyze.
On the theoretical front, we would like to derive conditions under which a
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. As discussed in 3.2.2, this would involve
proving that the utility functions of the airlines are diagonally strict concave.
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Appendix A
Disruption Scenarios
AIRPORT START TIME DURATION
ORIGINAL
CAPACITY
ADJUSTED
CAPACITY
SCENARIO 1
DCA 20:30 270 21 16
DCA 1:00 60 24 18
DCA 2:00 60 35 26
DCA 3:00 15 48 36
SCENARIO 2
SFO 16:00 120 30 23
SCENARIO 3
EWR 20:30 30 30 23
EWR 21:00 180 25 19
EWR 0:00 120 30 23
EWR 2:00 60 35 26
EWR 3:00 120 48 36
SCENARIO 4
JFK 19:00 120 40 30
JFK 21:00 300 35 26
JFK 2:00 120 40 30
SCENARIO 5
LGA 18:00 180 36 27
LGA 21:00 300 30 23
LGA 2:00 120 40 30
SCENARIO 6
EWR 16:00 300 38 29
EWR 21:00 420 30 23
SCENARIO 7
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
AIRPORT START TIME DURATION
ORIGINAL
CAPACITY
ADJUSTED
CAPACITY
ORD 19:00 60 72 54
ORD 20:00 180 76 57
ORD 23:00 150 84 63
SCENARIO 8
MDW 22:15 150 22 17
SCENARIO 9
JFK 17:00 120 54 41
JFK 19:00 300 36 27
JFK 0:00 120 38 29
JFK 2:00 120 54 41
SCENARIO 10
EWR 17:00 120 38 29
EWR 19:00 180 30 23
EWR 22:00 360 38 29
SCENARIO 11
SFO 16:00 60 30 23
SCENARIO 12
SFO 17:00 75 30 23
SCENARIO 13
LGA 17:00 120 38 29
LGA 19:00 240 28 21
LGA 23:00 270 38 29
SCENARIO 14
IAD 19:00 60 34 26
IAD 20:00 240 30 23
IAD 0:00 90 34 26
SCENARIO 15
EWR 17:00 180 38 29
SCENARIO 16
SFO 15:30 150 30 23
SFO 18:00 15 48 36
SCENARIO 17
LGA 19:15 390 38 29
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
AIRPORT START TIME DURATION
ORIGINAL
CAPACITY
ADJUSTED
CAPACITY
SCENARIO 18
JFK 16:00 180 30 23
JFK 19:00 120 34 26
JFK 21:00 120 36 27
JFK 23:00 60 40 30
SCENARIO 19
SFO 15:30 210 30 23
SFO 19:00 60 45 34
SCENARIO 20
LGA 14:00 60 21 16
LGA 15:00 120 30 23
LGA 17:00 240 35 26
LGA 21:00 240 40 30
SCENARIO 21
PHL 20:45 75 45 34
PHL 22:00 105 52 39
SCENARIO 22
LGA 18:15 90 40 30
LGA 19:45 60 34 26
LGA 20:45 195 30 23
LGA 0:00 120 34 26
LGA 2:00 45 40 30
SCENARIO 23
EWR 16:30 330 36 27
EWR 22:00 105 42 32
SCENARIO 24
SFO 15:00 135 30 23
SCENARIO 25
ORD 14:00 180 74 56
ORD 17:00 90 80 60
SCENARIO 26
LGA 20:45 210 32 24
SCENARIO 27
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
AIRPORT START TIME DURATION
ORIGINAL
CAPACITY
ADJUSTED
CAPACITY
EWR 18:00 60 38 29
EWR 19:00 120 40 30
EWR 21:00 120 34 26
EWR 23:00 60 36 27
SCENARIO 28
JFK 18:00 240 43 32
JFK 22:00 240 36 27
JFK 2:00 60 43 32
SCENARIO 29
PHL 0:15 135 36 27
SCENARIO 30
ATL 18:00 300 96 72
SCENARIO 31
LGA 21:30 210 34 26
LGA 1:00 60 15 11
LGA 2:00 60 25 19
LGA 3:00 30 34 26
SCENARIO 32
EWR 16:00 180 38 29
EWR 19:00 300 44 33
EWR 0:00 120 34 26
EWR 2:00 90 44 33
SCENARIO 33
JFK 21:00 60 40 30
JFK 22:00 240 35 26
JFK 2:00 30 44 33
SCENARIO 34
SFO 2:00 300 30 23
SCENARIO 35
IAD 14:30 165 40 30
SCENARIO 36
JFK 20:30 30 40 30
JFK 21:00 240 30 23
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
AIRPORT START TIME DURATION
ORIGINAL
CAPACITY
ADJUSTED
CAPACITY
JFK 1:00 60 35 26
JFK 2:00 60 40 30
JFK 3:00 45 45 34
SCENARIO 37
PHL 20:00 60 35 26
PHL 21:00 240 30 23
PHL 1:00 60 35 26
PHL 2:00 60 40 30
PHL 3:00 60 45 34
SCENARIO 38
IAD 20:30 270 21 16
IAD 1:00 60 40 30
IAD 2:00 60 50 38
SCENARIO 39
ATL 17:00 120 104 78
ATL 19:00 30 102 77
ATL 19:30 210 94 71
ATL 23:00 60 96 72
ATL 0:00 120 104 78
SCENARIO 40
LGA 19:45 15 40 30
LGA 20:00 60 30 23
LGA 21:00 180 25 19
LGA 0:00 60 30 23
LGA 1:00 105 35 26
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